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POLICY
Non-invasive prenatal testing: ethical issues explored
Antina de Jong*,1, Wybo J Dondorp2, Christine EM de Die-Smulders3,4, Suzanne GM Frints3,4
and Guido MWR de Wert2
This paper explores the ethical implications of introducing non-invasive prenatal diagnostic tests (NIPD tests) in prenatal
screening for foetal abnormalities. NIPD tests are easy and safe and can be performed early in pregnancy. Precisely because
of these features, it is feared that informed consent may become more difficult, that both testing and selective abortion
will become ‘normalized’, and that there will be a trend towards accepting testing for minor abnormalities and non-medical
traits as well. In our view, however, the real moral challenge of NIPD testing consists in the possibility of linking up a technique
with these features (easy, safe and early) with new genomic technologies that allow prenatal diagnostic testing for a much
broader range of abnormalities than is the case in current procedures. An increase in uptake and more selective abortions
need not in itself be taken to signal a thoughtless acceptance of these procedures. However, combining this with considerably
enlarging the scope of NIPD testing will indeed make informed consent more difficult and challenge the notion of prenatal
screening as serving reproductive autonomy. If broad NIPD testing includes later-onset diseases, the ‘right not to know’
of the future child will become a new issue in the debate about prenatal screening. With regard to the controversial
issue of selective abortion, it may make a morally relevant difference that after NIPD testing, abortion can be done early.
A lower moral status may be attributed to the foetus at that moment, given the dominant opinion that the moral status
of the foetus progressively increases with its development.
European Journal of Human Genetics (2010) 18, 272–277; doi:10.1038/ejhg.2009.203; published online 2 December 2009
Since the discovery of cell-free foetal DNA/RNA (cffDNA/RNA) in
maternal plasma in 1997,1 the possibility to use this cffDNA/RNA
for non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) has been investigated
many times.2–6 cffDNA/RNA can be obtained from a maternal
blood sample, as early as 4 weeks of gestation,7 but currently only
reliably so from 7 weeks of gestation.4 This development holds the
promise of NIPD testing early in pregnancy and without the small,
but significant risk of foetal loss that the current invasive procedures
of chorionic villus sampling (CVS) and amniocentesis (AP) carry.
NIPD testing for the determination of a Y-signal for pregnancies
at risk of X-linked disorders and for diagnosis of Rhesus factor status
in RhD-negative women is now being translated into clinical practice.4
In many European countries, discussion about broader applications
of NIPD testing can be expected in the coming years.8,9 The feasibility
of NIPD for trisomy 21, 13 and 18 has already been shown,2 but
large-scale independent studies are still needed. Sex-chromosomal
abnormalities (eg, Turner syndrome (X0) and triple X syndrome
(XXX)) could in principle be diagnosed by NIPD testing as well,4
if reliable quantitative tests become available in the future and the
maternal ‘background’ can be excluded from testing. Even if accurate
NIPD testing for the mentioned abnormalities becomes possible,
the clinical utility of the test remains to be assessed. This includes
balancing the benefits to the harms also with regard to its psycholo-
gical, ethical, legal, social and economic implications.10,11 The possible
ethical implications of NIPD as a new approach to prenatal testing
have so far been reviewed in a few publications.4,8,9,12–17 Apart from
clear benefits related to avoiding the miscarriage risk of present
invasive methods, important potential drawbacks have been mentioned
as well. For one thing, proper counselling and informed consent is
argued to become more challenging when offering NIPD testing.
Moreover, there is a concern that the ease and safety of NIPD may
lead to prenatal screening being increasingly conceived as a matter
of course, both by those making the offer and by the women under-
going the test. Related to this is the concern that selective abortion
of foetuses with minor abnormalities, the wrong sex or unwanted
paternity, will become normalized.
This paper aims to expand and refine these ethical evaluations
and will add some new ethical perspectives with regard to possible
implications of NIPD at present and in the future.
In our view, it is not so much the fact that foetal material used
for prenatal testing can be obtained early and non-invasively (allowing
easy and safe testing) that would lead to moral challenges. Rather, it is
the fact that a technology with these features would be open to being
used for testing a potentially much broader range of abnormalities
than those included in the presently used method of microscopic
chromosome analysis (karyotyping).
Although NIPD testing can also be applied in high genetic-risk
families and for the management of pregnancy, the focus of this paper
will primarily be on the application of NIPD testing in the screening
context. The reason for this focus on prenatal screening is that in the
near future, the question if, and if so, in what way NIPD testing is to
be applied within prenatal screening strategies should be considered
and discussed by policy makers, health care professionals and society
at large.
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To avoid confusion, a preliminary remark is needed on terminology.
In medicine, ‘screening’ is often used as referring to a kind of test for
risk assessment or disease discovery. However, after the convention in
normative and regulatory discourse, we will use ‘screening’ as referring
to any systematic and unsolicited offer of predictive testing (using
whatever types of test) involving individuals who themselves have no
reason (yet) to seek medical help for the condition in question.18 In
this broader sense, screening stands in contrast to ‘diagnosis’ as testing
on indication.
CURRENT PRACTICE OF PRENATAL SCREENING
Prenatal screening is widely accepted and is considered to be impor-
tant to enable women and their partners to make informed re-
productive choices.19 In many countries, prenatal screening strategies
consist of two elements.20,21
First, screening for Down’s syndrome (trisomy 21) and other
aneuploidies by means of a risk-assessment test and, in case of a
positive initial result, a diagnostic invasive prenatal test is offered for
further diagnosis such as CVS at 11–13 weeks of gestation or
amniocentesis at 15–18 weeks of gestation. These invasive procedures
may induce a miscarriage in 0.3–1.0% of the pregnancies investi-
gated.20,22,23 The risk-assessment test generally combines biochemical
markers in maternal serum and ultrasound markers (nuchal translu-
cency measurement) to determine whether there is a higher risk of
having a child with DS or other aneuploidies. If so, a diagnostic test,
such as conventional karyotyping (cytogenetic analysis) or rapid
aneuploidy detection (DNA analysis), is offered to confirm or exclude
the presence of a chromosomal abnormality in the foetus.20,22–24
Second, an ultrasound investigation is offered at week 18–20 of
gestation to identify major structural, congenital malformations and
also to look for so-called ‘soft’ markers that increase the risk for
chromosomal or genetic syndromes. When there is an increased risk, a
more detailed ultrasound scan and/or invasive prenatal or postnatal
diagnostic tests are needed for further diagnosis.20
POSSIBLE DYNAMICS OF NIPD TESTING
NIPD testing in the context of prenatal screening
Research into NIPD testing has mainly focused on those chromosomal
abnormalities currently diagnosed with karyotyping as part of
the prenatal screening strategies. Wright distinguishes five possible
applications of NIPD testing in this context: as an additional test to
improve overall risk assessment, as an intermediate test between risk
assessment and invasive diagnostic testing for high-risk pregnancies, as
a replacement for current risk-assessment tests, as a replacement for
current invasive diagnostic tests or as a replacement for both risk-
assessment and diagnostic tests.8 As structural abnormalities per se are
not identified through NIPD testing, its possible introduction would
not affect current ultrasound screening.
In the ethical discussions thus far, NIPD testing as a substitution for
the present combination of risk assessment and invasive diagnostic
testing seems generally to be regarded as ultimately the most likely
scenario.4,8,12,14,16 Indeed, if NIPD tests can easily, safely, reliably and
cheaply diagnose chromosomal abnormalities such as trisomy 21 in
early pregnancy, this will entail abolishment of the current two-step-
testing process.
Increasing number of prenatal diagnostic tests
An important implication of NIPD testing as a one-step approach to
prenatal screening is that prenatal diagnostic tests will be offered to all
pregnant women, instead of to a limited high-risk group. This increase
in the number of diagnostic tests does not mean an increase in the
extent of the actual group that is approached with an unsolicited
prenatal test offer: only the nature of this offer will change. Direct
access to diagnostic testing has the advantage of avoiding false positive
and false negative outcomes of risk assessment. This means that all
pregnant women can profit from the more certain diagnostic test
results for reproductive decision making, which enhances their repro-
ductive autonomy.25 However, a morally relevant aspect is also that a
diagnosis early in pregnancy may have the drawback of increasing
the burden of knowledge and choice for the women concerned. As
chances of an affected pregnancy ending in miscarriage decrease with
gestational age, early testing will more often burden women with
‘unnecessary’ decision making concerning pregnancies that may
spontaneously miscarry.8,26
INFORMED CONSENT FOR NIPD TESTING: THE NATURE OF
THE TEST
Concern has been expressed that offering NIPD testing on a wide scale
would undermine informed consent.8,12–15 If current two-step testing
is substituted by a single diagnostic test, it is supposed to be more
difficult to provide all pregnant women with adequate information
and pre-test counselling, ‘despite being conceptually easier’.8 The
quote refers to the fact that one-step screening can do without the
concept of risk, which most people find difficult to handle. But why
would informed consent in such an approach still be more difficult?
The idea behind this concern may be that in two-step screening
information about the challenges and possible outcomes of further
testing need only be given to the small subset of women with a positive
screen result, whereas all necessary information must be given at once
in one-step screening. However, this view is morally problematic, as it
ignores that risk assessment is potentially a first step in a sequence of
testing with exactly the same possible implications as one-step screen-
ing. As the information to be given before risk assessment should not
be limited to this first ‘innocent’ step, it is unclear why one-step
screening as such would make information and pre-test counselling
more difficult. However, a further assumption behind the concern
about informed consent may be that introducing NIPD testing will be
combined with enlarging the scope of prenatal screening. As we will
argue later on in this article that would indeed make informed consent
more challenging. But the point we want to make here is that there is
nothing in the nature of the NIPD test itself (its one-step character)
that would lead to this greater challenge. Of course, this is not to deny
that in current practice information, counselling and consent are often
inadequately dealt with27–30 and this may also be the case with regard
to NIPD testing. However, as long as NIPD testing will be offered for
the same range of abnormalities as in the present two-step approach to
prenatal screening, there is no reason to assume that these problems
will be larger than they already are.
NORMALIZATION OF NIPD TESTING
A further concern that has been raised is that the introduction of
NIPD as a risk-free procedure may lead to ‘normalization’ of prenatal
testing. In addition to what has more generally been referred to as a
‘technological imperative’, the mechanism behind this would be driven
by the specific features of NIPD testing.4,8,12–14,31 A distinction can be
made between normalization of the offer and of the uptake, although
these aspects are of course related.
Normalization of the offer means that NIPD tests will be portrayed
by clinicians and experienced by pregnant women as part of routine
antenatal care, because, due to its ease and safety, it seems to be a
rather trivial test to offer and take. This may lead to normalization of
uptake, ranging from a rather thoughtless uptake to women feeling
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socially pressurized to be tested.8,13,32 If this implies testing without
informed consent, uptake cannot be said to be the result of nor to be
promoting autonomous reproductive decision making. Of course, an
increase in uptake does not necessarily indicate its normalization, as it
might also reflect a conscious positive reception of the new possibi-
lities of NIPD testing by pregnant women,33 and thus signify the
achievement of the aim to ‘facilitate parental reproductive choice’.8
However, as it has often been observed that in current prenatal
screening programmes, test uptake is not always on the basis of
adequate understanding,32 there is indeed reason for concern that
the ease and safety of NIPD testing will make this even more difficult
to achieve. This concern is reinforced by the finding that health care
professionals seem inclined to the view that a less stringent standard of
informed consent would suffice for NIPD testing.34 We find this
problematic because, iatrogenic risks aside, the possible outcomes and
consequences of invasive and non-invasive diagnostic testing remain
the same. We, therefore, agree that introducing NIPD testing should
not be regarded as a reason for loosening present guidelines for
informed consent.34
NORMALIZATION AND TRIVIALIZATION OF EARLY SELECTIVE
ABORTION
Easy, safe and early NIPD testing might lead to an increase in the
number of affected foetuses aborted.13 In addition to this possible
quantitative implication, concern has been expressed about a qualita-
tive change in selective abortion procedures as well. As Hall et al13
comment: ‘More generalized use of non-invasive testing could facil-
itate selective terminations of pregnancy in a range of conditions
hitherto not diagnosed prenatally and where the arguments for and
against termination may not have received sufficiently scrutiny’. We
will consider this possible ‘trivialization of abortion’ in relationship to
the possible earlier timing of selective abortion because of NIPD
testing.
NIPD testing early in pregnancy may on balance offer important
benefits for the women involved. It enables earlier reassurance and,
therefore, allows for ‘better opportunities for prenatal bonding’14 for
those women who might experience their pregnancy being ‘tentative’
during the testing period. At the same time, early testing enables a
longer period for the decision-making process after a positive test
result, which may be valued positively by some women as well. In
addition, if a positive test result leads to a choice for selective abortion,
this termination might be physically and psychologically less burden-
ing when carried out earlier in pregnancy.13 These implications for
women may support the view and the experience that early testing and
abortion, even if performed for abnormalities hitherto not prenatally
diagnosed, may be less problematic. Empirical research is needed to
illuminate women’s attitudes and preferences in this regard.
The early timing of abortion is also ethically relevant because of
different opinions about the moral status of the embryo or early
foetus.35,36 The timing of abortion is only ethically insignificant if an
absolute or high moral status is assigned to the embryo right from the
start, or, conversely, when there is no independent status attributed to
the embryo/foetus at all. However, the dominant opinion in most
western countries, often also reflected in legislation, is that the moral
status of the embryo/foetus progressively increases with its develop-
ment (the gradualist view).26 A variant of this view refers to transi-
tional moments at specific stages in embryonic or foetal development.
As cffDNA/RNA can currently reliably be obtained from a maternal
blood sample from 7 weeks of gestation (5 weeks of development), the
beginning of cerebral development at 6 weeks (40 days) (8 weeks of
gestation) is of special importance in this connection. In some
religions, this developmental stage is associated with ensoulment.37,38
Adherents of this ‘40 days position’ would presumably have no or less
moral objections to selective abortion before that specific point in
time, because of the lower or absent moral status of the foetus before
that moment. More generally, adherents of a gradualist view will
favour the possibility of earlier selective abortions after NIPD testing.
It is conceivable that this time factor might as well be relevant for the
scope of the conditions for which NIPD testing will be applied.
To summarize, the lower moral status of the embryo and the
possibly less traumatic psychological and emotional implications of
early abortion might influence and to some extent justify a certain
broadening of the scope of NIPD testing.
CHANGING THE SCOPE OF PRENATAL TESTING
Narrow or broad?
NIPD testing is feared to be applied for more and also for increasingly
minor abnormalities, without adequate justification: the so-called
‘specification creep’.8,13 The reasoning behind this concern seems to
be that the invasiveness of current diagnostic testing prevents expan-
sion of its scope. Supposedly, one would not take the risk of losing a
healthy child with invasive testing, but for the detection of (a high risk
for) a really serious disease. In this view, the ease, safety and early
moment of NIPD testing could be an incentive to apply NIPD testing
for more and less serious conditions in the future. One could,
however, also reason the other way around: the effort and the risk
of the invasive procedure may be an incentive to test for as much
abnormalities as possible, just to make this risk more proportional and
to provide a more firm justification.39,40
Karyotyping has been the ‘Gold Standard’ for diagnostic testing in
the screening context for almost half a century now and also seems to
be the reference point for the scope of NIPD testing.8 When NIPD
testing implies abolishment of the current risk assessment, a limitation
of the scope of NIPD testing to the chromosomal abnormalities
diagnosed by karyotyping seems no longer evident. Furthermore,
the issue whether the scope of invasive diagnostic testing should be
narrower or broader than the current scope has already been under
discussion for some years now.41–43 Limitation to some well-defined
anomalies, such as trisomy 21, 13 and 18, has been proposed, as well
as an expansion of the scope by, for example, array-based comparative
genomic hybridization.44,45 One of the main reasons to offer narrow
testing is to reduce the probability of unexpected and clinically unclear
findings. These can lead to difficult pre- and post-test counselling
situations, impair informed decision making and make decisions
regarding selective abortion emotionally more difficult and morally
controversial. A broader scope is mainly supported by the argument
that prenatal testing should focus on detecting any possible (severe)
disability, irrespective of its cause and depending on the woman’s or
couple’s choice. If people prefer to have maximum information,
withholding information would deprive them of their autonomous
reproductive choice.42
The above shows that the features of NIPD testing in itself do not
necessitate a specific scope of testing: it could be narrow as well as
broad.
NIPD testing for heterogeneous abnormalities
Although not feasible in the near future, a possible future expansion of
the scope of NIPD testing has been brought up several times.4,8,12 If it
might indeed become possible to include a kind of total genome
sequencing in NIPD testing, the scope of NIPD testing in the context
of common prenatal screening could exceed that of karyotyping. Then
its scope might not only include (mono)genetic and/or congenital
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disorders, but also complex and late-onset disorders.4,8,12 Such an
increase in scope is assumed to be ‘more ethically problematic’.8 It has
proven to be next to impossible to reach consensus about the
definition of a list of diseases that are serious enough to test prenatally
and to justify selective abortion – even if performed early. Partly
because of variable expression, changes over time because of evolving
treatment and personal situation, the severity of diseases is perceived
differently. Still, broad ethically relevant categories of diseases and
genotypes may be discerned: causative genetic traits for congenital
disorders with clear clinical consequences, causative genetic traits for
late-onset diseases, genetic variants associated with increased suscept-
ibility to disease and carriership of recessive disorders. Inclusion of all
these categories in an NIPD-testing array will lead to different ethical
challenges, which will be discussed below.
INFORMED CONSENT FOR NIPD TESTING: THE SCOPE OF THE
TEST
Generic consent
If an NIPD test will be aimed at detection of different categories of
disorders simultaneously, this would complicate informed consent,
counselling and decision making. Testing for (many) heterogeneous
abnormalities at once would require more, more elaborate and
detailed information. In addition, findings of unclear significance,
which are always present in complex testing, would require special
attention. Altogether, this could lead to an ‘information overload’,
which could impair the decision-making process.46 More intensive
counselling would be needed, which might be too time consuming
and expensive if offered on a wide scale. Therefore, the requirement of
extensive informed consent for broad NIPD testing may be really
problematic to comply with.
As regards this subject, the alternative of generic consent has been
proposed.47 This concept ‘would emphasize broader concepts and
common-denominator issues in genetic screening’ by providing
‘general information to obtain consent for the screening and much
more detailed information on specific conditions only after they have
been detected’.47
A conceivable way of obtaining generic consent for an NIPD test
with a broader scope would be to inform women in more general
terms about categories of abnormalities included. On the basis of this
information, women might be given the opportunity to indicate what
kinds of abnormalities they would prefer to be told about.26 This
approach has already been discussed with regard to current karyotyp-
ing.22 Some kind of generic consent seems to be inevitable when
offering a broad NIPD test. The question is whether this is a justifiable
way of executing the principle of respecting reproductive autonomy,
because it endangers the feasibility of truly informed choices.26
In this respect, offering broad NIPD testing to all pregnant women
may be seen as the molecular equivalent of the second trimester
ultrasound scan. As the prenatal ultrasound scan may also detect a
broad range of foetal defects, informed consent would at least require
informing women before the scan about the variety of test results they
could possibly encounter and have to deal with. Although a lack of
proper informed consent has been reported in this context as well,48,49
this has been a remarkably less debated subject than with regard to
risk-assessment and invasive prenatal diagnostic tests.27–30,50 The
implementation of informed consent for these latter two prenatal
tests has been proven to be inadequate several times, showing a
discrepancy between theory and practice in this regard. Hence, there
is a need to discuss the model and the implementation of informed
consent for any present and future prenatal screening offer. The
question will ultimately be to what extent the condition of informed
consent is really valued: if the features, scope and implementation of
prenatal testing are adjusted to the requirements of proper informed
consent, the value of this condition will be reinforced. If it is the other
way around, a declared adherence to the value of informed consent
may well be deluding.51
Decision-making process and the right not to know
NIPD testing for a broad and heterogeneous range of abnormalities
would generate a large amount of information and inevitably include
findings the significance of which would be difficult, if at all, to
interpret and explain. Unclear findings might lead to extensive
diagnostic follow-up and even to the testing of parents to establish
inheritance of unusual results, which may confront parents with
unexpected findings about themselves as well. This leads to the
question whether such knowledge would be harmful or beneficial
for the parents and the future child. Unclear findings regarding the
foetus could lead to confusion and unnecessary anxiety for parents,
which is likely to persist throughout the pregnancy and into the
postnatal period if the pregnancy is continued. A decision to terminate
a wanted pregnancy on a basis of unclear testing results may be
associated with ‘particular feelings of guilt’.42 On the one hand, patient
autonomy may still be an important consideration for providing
women with more information about their foetus, if they prefer
so.52 On the other hand, it has been asserted that prenatal screening
for 1000 genetic variations with 99.9% accuracy for true positives at
once may lead to the consequence that ‘every foetus will be identified
as abnormal’, thereby undermining the aim of this screening.43 These
different views again underline the necessity of empirical research into
women’s attitudes, preferences and expected burdens regarding
(broad) NIPD testing to assess the requirement of proportionality.
The issue of the right not to know of the future child might become
a relevant issue in case of testing for monogenetic late-onset diseases
and for increased susceptibility to diseases. Unsolicited knowledge of
these traits would be an invasion of the autonomy of future children
who have prenatally been diagnosed. If NIPD testing included these
different kinds of disorders and the pregnancy was continued, it would
resemble the possible future scenario of whole genome profiling of
newborns, which would not be directed at any particular disease, but
would reveal information about many and heterogeneous abnormal-
ities, including late-onset diseases.53 As such, the resemblance of broad
NIPD testing with newborn profiling indicates a blurring of the
distinction between reproductive and non-reproductive screening.
Testing foetuses would de facto amount to testing (future) children.
Disclosure of findings about late-onset diseases in the neonatal
screening context is considered to be incompatible with the widely,
but not universally, endorsed maxim that predictive genetic testing
should in principle be avoided in minors to protect their autonomy
and privacy.53,54 The only accepted exception is if medical interven-
tions are available to alter the course of the disease.53,54
NIPD TESTING FOR NON-MEDICAL REASONS
NIPD testing for establishing sex or paternity, which is currently
commercially offered, and subsequent selective abortion if the foetus is
of the ‘wrong’ sex or from the ‘wrong’ biological father are generally
thought to be problematic.8,14,55–57
With regard to gender testing, one concern is the preference in
some societies of having a boy over a girl, which could have disrupting
effects on those societies if selective abortion of female foetuses would
be performed on a large scale. In that case, society could have good
reason to restrict individual choice, because it undermines a public
good.58 Indeed, in some countries, sex selection is prohibited for
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exactly this reason.59 If sex selection would reflect a discrimination
against women and systematically reinforce that bias, this could
constitute a moral and legal injustice to be prevented.60 However,
sex selection itself does not necessarily entail a discriminatory act. It
could as well be an act of responsibility for a future girl’s interest (eg,
to guard it from being treated unjustly) even if this motive would arise
against the background of a discriminatory society.36,61 Furthermore,
couples can have personal motives for sex selection, such as family
balancing. Some reject this as showing that children are increasingly
seen as ‘commodities’. However, sex selection for family balancing can
also be valued as an opportunity for reproductive autonomy.62
With regard to prenatal paternity testing, there are hardly any
medical applications, except in case of inherited diseases in which the
underlying gene defect is not known and prenatal diagnostic tests
cannot, therefore, be used.16 Non-medical reasons include ambiguous
paternity in case of women with more than one sexual partner who
are unsure of the actual father, and women who may be pregnant as
the result of rape. In the latter case, paternity testing is not disputed,
whereas in the former case paternity testing has been criticized.8,13,14
It has been suggested to counsel the women involved about the
relative significance of biological kinship.14 To the extent that this is
carried out with the aim of reducing the number of prenatal paternity
tests, this approach strikes us as morally problematic. Counselling
should be respectful of how the woman herself perceives the emer-
gency situation leading to her request; counsellors should not try to
defuse the problem by defining it away. We also suspect that reluctance
to provide prenatal paternity testing may be prompted by an implicit
condemnation of a promiscuous life. This would clearly be moralistic
and unprofessional.
One should also realize that without paternity testing, women could
feel compelled to terminate the pregnancy anyhow. Or women could
feel compelled to continue the pregnancy, with the consequence of
having a child fathered by the wrong man. Prenatal paternity testing
may, therefore, lead to the least harm for the woman involved and be
morally justified.63
Although personal motives for sex selection and paternity testing
may be ethically controversial, abortion is allowed under various legal
rules regarding social termination.16,61 In the case of NIPD testing,
views regarding the moral status of the early embryo will be of
relevance with regard to both reasons for selective abortion.
CONCLUSION
On the one hand, women taking part in prenatal screening can profit
from the ease, safety and early moment of NIPD testing. The
introduction of a test with these features has ethically favourable
consequences: absence of iatrogenic miscarriage because of the test,
earlier reassurance, a longer period for decision-making and the
possibility of an early abortion, which may be physically and psycho-
logically less burdening and ethically less problematic because of
presumed lower moral foetal status. On the other hand, should
NIPD testing for a broader scope of abnormalities become possible
in the future, this will complicate the ethical issues regarding NIPD
testing. Informed consent will become far more challenging – if
attainable at all. Moreover, should NIPD testing become available
for a wide range of disorders including late-onset diseases, this may
lead to the same ethical difficulties as with regard to wide range testing
of newborns, in which the dominant view is that the child’s right not
to know should be respected. It is difficult to see how this respect can
be upheld when, after broadening prenatal testing, children will be
born with a positive test result for a serious late-onset disease. The
debate about the ethical challenges of broad genetic testing is currently
conducted in the contexts of neonatal screening and invasive prenatal
testing. In this article, we have shown that the same issues will present
themselves even more forcefully should broad NIPD testing become
possible. A proactive further analysis of these issues is urgently needed.
As we have stressed, this also requires empirical research into pregnant
women’s attitudes, needs and preferences concerning different
modalities of prenatal testing.
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